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Abstract 
Despite normative predictions from economics and biology, unrelated strangers can often 
develop the trust necessary to reap gains from one-shot economic exchange opportunities. This 
appears to be especially true when declared intentions and emotions can be cheaply 
communicated. Perhaps even more puzzling to economists and biologists is the observation that 
anonymous and unrelated individuals, known to have breached trust, often make effective use of 
cheap signals, such as promises and apologies, to encourage trust re-extension. We used a pair of 
trust games with one-way communication and emotion surveys to investigate the role of 
emotions in regulating the propensity to message, apologize, re-extend trust, and demonstrate 
trustworthiness. This design allowed us to observe the endogenous emergence and natural 
distribution of trust-relevant behaviors, remedial strategies used by promise-breakers, their 
effects on behavior, and subsequent outcomes. We found that emotions triggered by interaction 
outcomes are predictable and also predict subsequent apology and trust re-extension. The role of 
emotions in behavioral regulation helps explain why messages are produced, when they can be 
trusted, and when trust will be re-extended. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we explore the role of emotions in regulating cheap signaling, trust re-
extension, and trustworthy behavior in the wake of a single trust-based interaction between 
strangers. Interactions with strangers have presented recurrent adaptive problems over the course 
of human evolutionary history (Fehr & Henrich 2003) and are common in modern society, 
especially in global markets (Nowak & Sigmund 2005; Seabright 2010). Sometimes unexpected 
opportunities for repeated exchange with previously cooperative or uncooperative partners arise.
1
 
Once exchange histories establish, partners with mutually beneficial non-binding agreements 
often reap gains from iterated trust-based trade with one another (e.g., see Cochard et al. 2004; 
Boero et al. 2009; Kaplan et al. 2012). However, investors ceding resources (in anticipation of 
desired returns) remain subject to various kinds of exploitation by previously trusted partners. 
Partners who demonstrated trustworthiness in the past might subsequently engage in 
Machiavellian manipulations (Humphrey 1976; Byrne & Whiten 1988) by sending false signals 
about intentions to engage in future trustworthy behavior. Upon being re-extended trust, these 
previously trusted partners can opportunistically exploit their positions.
2
 Alternatively, if a 
partner was previously untrustworthy (e.g., breaking a promise and not returning profits on 
investment) but claims to have intentions and propensity for future trustworthiness, an investor 
must decide whether to forgo potential gains from future trust-based exchange (by not re-
extending trust) or else pursue the available opportunity with that previously untrustworthy 
partner, at the risk of being repeatedly deceived or exploited.
3
 While much attention has been 
given to the production and evaluation of cues and signals affecting novel trust extension, less 
attention has been given to the dilemma of trust re-extension and the role of emotions in 
regulating relevant behaviors. 
The ability to integrate evaluations of reputation from cues and signal quality, infer a 
partner’s propensity towards future trustworthiness, and accordingly regulate trust re-extension 
would have been a highly advantageous trait over the course of human evolutionary history and 
should continue to be in modern economies. Recalibrational theories of emotions (Tooby & 
Cosmides 1990; Schniter & Shields 2013; Schniter, Sheremeta & Shields 2013) have proposed 
that key emotions have been selected to assist us in accomplishing these tasks. We test the 
propositions that new information about trust-based interaction outcomes triggers emotions, and 
that, when experienced, these emotions regulate re-affirmative and remedial behaviors and the 
                                               
1 While transactions with strangers may have been full of danger, mistrust, and exploitation for much of human 
evolutionary history (Diamond 1997; Bowles 1998), at least more recently, since the 19th century, as modern market 
society and per capita income have grown (Clark 2007), the norm of exchange has moved from more exclusively 
personal to more anonymous (North 1990). Market proliferation, in turn, has reinforced learning of the notion that 
trust in strangers results in benefits, resulting in greater trustworthiness (Zak & Knack 2001; Henrich et al. 2001, 
2010; Al-Ubaydli et al. 2013). 
2 McNally and Tanner (2011) speculated that under conditions of “an unforgiving Machiavellian society”, one-shot 
cooperation is most likely to evolve. 
3 As suggested by the phrase “…fool me twice, shame on me”, there may be stronger hedonic costs to being a 
targeted victim of repeated deception, than are experienced after being a first-time victim. 
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propensity to re-extend trust. We propose that emotions integrate new information about trust-
based interaction outcomes, providing hedonic feedback that people experience as either 
positively valenced (motivating continuation of prior behaviors associated with its occurrence) or 
negatively valenced (motivating disengagement and pursuit of alternative strategies). This 
positive or negative emotional feedback is designed to motivate changes to behavioral 
propensities so as to enhance success in future relationships characterized by similar cooperation 
dilemmas. For example, when trust has been developed and assured, good feelings are 
experienced, motivating the trustee to re-affirm the good relationship and demonstrate more 
trustworthiness, and motivating the investor to trust the trustee’s cheap signals and re-extend 
trust. Alternatively, when a trustee uses cheap-to-produce signals to deceive an investor and 
generate opportunity for exploitation, the investor and trustee experience negative emotions. An 
investor’s negative emotional reaction to a trustee’s untrustworthy behavior motivates a response 
consisting of distrust of further cheap signals, imposition of costs, and restriction of benefits. A 
trustee’s negative emotional reaction to acting untrustworthy (breaking a promise and exploiting 
the investor), motivates remedial efforts (e.g., apology) targeting the affected investor – 
especially when there is possibility of future trust-based exchange opportunity.  
To study the predictors of emotions and the effects of emotions on spontaneous 
messaging and trust re-extension, we conducted a non-deceptive study wherein financially 
motivated participants used endogenously created and naturally distributed promises and 
messages. Our study is based on a version of the “investment game” by Berg, Dickhaut & 
McCabe (1995). In our experiment trustees made non-binding promises of investment-contingent 
returns, then investors decided whether to invest, and finally trustees decided how much to 
return. Since sending money is risky, investments are usually interpreted as trust. Likewise, 
because voluntary returns are costly to trustees, the delivery of promised returns on investment 
(ROI) is interpreted as evidence of trustworthiness. We also administered a 20 item survey in 
which participants reported their emotional status as a consequence of the decisions and 
interaction outcomes that they just experienced. After an unexpected second game was 
announced, but before it commenced, trustees could send a one-way message. This design 
allowed us to observe the endogenous emergence and natural distribution of trust-relevant 
behaviors, consequent emotions, and focus on these emotions’ effects on naturally occurring 
communication strategies used by trustees, investors’ trust re-extension, and trustee’s 
trustworthiness. While results on the observed frequencies of game behaviors in this experiment 
are reported in Schniter, Sheremeta, and Sznycer (2013), we did not previously examined the 
role of emotions. In this paper we evaluate reports of emotions and their role in regulating 
behaviors relevant to the dilemma of trust re-extension. 
 
2. Theoretical Background 
Despite normative predictions, trust is often developed in experimental one-shot 
environments with unrelated strangers (e.g., see Dawes & Thaler 1988; Kiyonari et al. 2000; 
McCabe et al. 2003; Krasnow et al. 2013), especially when facilitated by cheap talk and 
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emotions (Gambetta 1988; McElreath et al. 2003; Frank 1988, 2004; Ben-Ner & Putterman 
2009; Ben-Ner et al. 2011; Sheremeta & Zhang 2014). When taking into account the observation 
that people exist and have long existed under the uncertain but ever present shadow of possible 
future interactions with others, the propensity to trust (despite hazards for opportunism) may 
bring net exchange benefits.
4
 Under such conditions natural selection may have favored those 
with the propensity to cooperate even when exposed to cues that interactions were one-shot and 
interaction partners were unknown (Delton et al. 2011; Krasnow et al. 2013). Sayings like “you 
always meet twice in a lifetime”, "you haven't seen the last of me", and “dangerous enemies will 
meet again in narrow streets” seem to provide justification for the human tendency to treat others 
as if they will be beneficial exchange partners or threats in the future, despite the absence of cues 
assuring there will be repeated interaction. The one-shot investment game (Berg, Dickhaut & 
McCabe 1995) that models the opportunity to develop and allocate gains through exchange, has 
shown time and again that people exposed to one-shot sequential exchange opportunities with 
anonymous others tend to behave in a mutually beneficial way (for reviews see Ostrom & 
Walker 2005; Balliet & Van Lange 2012) despite the normative proscription from game theory: 
do not cooperate because your partner will not cooperate.  
In the absence of information about past behavior, “cheap” messages (bearing little in the 
way of up-front costs for production) are often sent to receivers with the intention of 
communicating information about the sender (e.g., see Farrel & Rabin 1996). For example, non-
binding promises (of intended trustworthiness) have been shown to increase cooperation (Rubin 
& Brown 1975; Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland 1994; Elingsen & Johannesson 2004; Charness & 
Dufwenberg 2006; Sutter 2009). Where demonstrated behavior has informed investors of a 
trustee’s untrustworthiness, messages may be sent with the intention of persuading investors that 
the trustee is more trustworthy than inferred from cues alone. Many find it quite puzzling that so-
called “cheap signals” can effectively be used to negotiate trust between individuals with 
conflicting interests (Lachmann et al. 2001) and that it is even possible for promise-breakers to 
rebuild damaged trust by issuing apologies (Schniter, Sheremeta & Sznycer 2013). Below we 
review why trust can be built with the help of cheap-to-produce messages and why those who re-
extend trust to previously untrustworthy individuals (e.g., promise breakers) may take their 
messages into consideration. 
Cheap-to-produce messages can maintain their reliability because they often end up being 
“costly” after being used to deceive (Schniter, Sheremeta & Sznycer 2013). Through reputational 
sanctions or exclusion from future interactions, receivers of deceptively used cheap signals can 
impose ex post costs greater than the benefits initially derived from deceptively using those 
signals (Rohwer 1977; Masclet et al. 2003) – thereby maintaining signal reliability in the society 
in which it was used.  
                                               
4 Human psychological adaptations for sociality likely evolved under a selective regime characterized by repeated 
interactions among known others (Kelly 1995). 
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Though it has been studied little, it is reasonable to expect that the psychological 
machinery designed to produce and evaluate cheap signals is attuned to the experience and 
perception of emotions. Emotions are important components of message composition, speech 
production and perception, and face-to-face communication. Personal communication is known 
to improve cooperation (Orbell et al. 1988; Bohnet & Frey 1999; Ridings et al. 2002; Zheng et 
al. 2002; Buchan et al. 2006; Cason et al. 2012) by facilitating coordination, decreasing social 
distance, raising solidarity, and providing the cues of familiarity that are normally associated 
with trustworthy relationships. Adam Smith (1759) wrote of the “fellow feeling” that can be 
generated, for example as a consequence of sharing in another’s emotional state, and being part 
of the process of improving it. According to Smith, the capacity to experience the pleasurable 
“fellow feeling” is based on our ability to model another’s circumstances and emotional reaction 
to them, and to internally simulate (sympathize with) the emotional feelings that they might 
derive. When messages are produced
5
, they are often assembled with verbiage meant to 
demonstrate regard for the recipient, persuade a change in the recipient’s perspectives, and 
provide information of the signaler’s intentions and emotional experiences: things which may not 
be otherwise known (Pennebaker & Graybeal 2001). Though the messages we consider 
guarantee no honest information, their length is a potential indication of the effort invested into 
an attempt to communicate these potentially unknown things. On the other hand, where 
messages are intended as re-affirmations of known things (e.g., recent cooperation), their length 
is not as necessary. Thus to understand the human ecology of cheap signal production and 
evaluation, one should also understand the dynamic triggering of emotions and their targeted 
effects on the propensity to engage in communication.  
Recalibrational emotions respond to the presence of adaptive problems resulting from 
social dilemma outcomes (Schniter & Shields 2013; Schniter, Sheremeta & Shields 2013). In the 
presence of the appropriate triggers, emotional components such as physiological changes (e.g., 
arousal), facial expression and posture, subjective experience and action tendencies are produced 
(Frijda 1986; Tooby & Cosmides 1990). Emotionally affected speech and facial expression have 
long been believed to have some “honest signal” features revealing underlying emotional states 
(Darwin 1872). A century after Darwin, researchers began making a strong case that basic 
human emotions are not only universal in their distinct facial and vocal expressions, but also that 
the identification of these emotions exists and is consistent across humans. Evidently, humans 
can accurately recognize many basic emotions (e.g., happiness, surprise, sadness, fear, disgust 
and anger) across quite different cultures in faces (e.g., Ekman, Sorenson & Friesen 1969) and 
voices (Bryant & Barrett 2008; Sauter et al. 2010), supporting the notion that these 
communicative forms provide fairly reliable indicators of the emotion that the sender 
experiences (Keltner & Kring 1998) and that a reduction in ambiguity has been selected for in 
human emotional signaling (Searcy & Nowicki 2005). Frank (1988, 2004) proposed that 
                                               
5 Messaging is often an option (i.e., not compulsory). When optional, we expect people to tradeoff costs and 
benefits. Messaging may not be chosen for a variety of reasons including: to minimize cognitive effort, in an attempt 
to manage impressions, to save time, to pursue alternative opportunities that otherwise might be forgone. 
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emotions provide information about people’s behavior propensities because they work as 
commitment devices. As veridical signals, emotions appear to be sufficiently reliable in this 
capacity; emotional displays are more often than not involuntary and high levels of emotional 
expressivity are difficult to imitate (Boone & Buck 2003; Schug et al. 2010). Thus, the standard 
human ecology in which “cheap” signal production and evaluation was designed to operate is not 
entirely costless. Rather, because the signaling of emotional states is often veridical, language 
should be evaluated and trusted according to its correspondence with emotional propensities. 
Under these conditions, detection of deceptive language production would lead to the imposition 
of more costs than benefits on the signaler – effectively making cheaply produced language in 
the context of displayed emotions a “costly signal”.  
We anticipated that, despite the anonymity we guaranteed participants in our laboratory 
implementation of the Trust Game (i.e., ensuring that their partners would not personally identify 
or watch them), experiences of emotions would be reliably produced and recognized by those 
experiencing them. We evaluate the reported experience of several emotions (appreciation, 
contentment, cheerfulness, happiness, pride, believability, anger, disgust, aggravation, 
frustration, guilt, and shame) and whether these emotions predict the use of cheaply produced 
messages, trust re-extension, and trustworthy or opportunistic behavior. We hypothesize that 
these emotions serve the recalibrational functions outlined in Schniter and Shields (2013), and 
detail specific predictions about the triggering of these emotions and how experienced emotions 
will correlate with subsequent behaviors below. A few studies have also shown that the 
experience of emotions affects subsequent game behavior (Ketelaar & Au 2003; Fehr & Gachter 
2002; Dunn & Schweitzer 2005). However, with the exception of a few studies using deception, 
the experimental economics literature is silent as to what emotions are experienced and how they 
inform trust repair and re-extension in subsequent interactions after promises are broken and 
trust is damaged. 
 
3. Experiment Details and Hypotheses. 
3.1. Experiment Details 
The experiment was conducted at Chapman University’s ESI laboratory. 458 participants 
(229 pairs) were recruited from a standard campus-wide subject pool for participation in an 
experiment that could last up to 45 min. There were 25 experimental sessions. Each session had 
between 10 and 24 participants. The average experimental earnings were $18, ranging from a $0 
to $40, plus $7 for arriving to the experiment on time and participating. No participant 
participated more than once, and no participant had prior experience with a similar game 
environment. During an experimental session, participants seated at visually isolated cubicles 
interacted with each other anonymously over a local computer network. The experimental 
procedure, which lasted an average of 35 min total, and did not involve deception, proceeded as 
follows. Upon arrival, participants in the experiment were told that they would receive $7 for 
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participation, to be paid at the end of the session along with any additional money made during 
the session.  
Participants then received instructions (see Appendix A) for a single trust game with (i) 
no indication of a subsequent game to follow and (ii) no statements that the session would end at 
conclusion of that game. Participants were assigned to one of two roles: “Participant A” 
(investor), or “Participant B” (trustee). First, the trustee completed the following standardized 
statement (which we will refer to below as a promise) by selecting an integer from 0 to 20: “I 
(Participant B) promise to transfer back $___of my income to you (Participant A) if you choose 
IN”. This statement was not binding, however. That is, the trustee was not obligated to transfer 
back the amount promised to the investor, and both trustee and investor knew this. The computer 
conveyed the trustee’s statement to the investor and then the investor chose either OUT or IN. If 
the investor chose OUT, she received $5 and the trustee $0. If the investor chose IN, then the 
trustee received $20 (the “income”), after which he selected a whole dollar amount from $0 to 
$20 to send back to the investor.  
After the first trust game (game 1) finished, participants were given an emotional status 
survey that asked them to report how much they felt each of 20 emotional states (on a five point 
scale labeled (1) very slightly or not at all, (2) a little, (3) moderately, (4) quite a bit, (5) 
extremely) as a consequence of their recent game interactions and outcomes. The computer 
software presented all emotional states on one screen and in random order. After completing the 
survey we gave our participants additional instructions (see Appendix A) indicating that a second 
trust game (game 2) would follow. In game 2, participants were told they would remain in the 
same roles and interact with the same partner as in game 1. However, prior to game 2, the trustee 
was given an opportunity to use a message box to send a one-way message to the investor. 
Trustees were told that “in these messages, no one is allowed to identify him or herself by name, 
number, gender, or appearance,” but that other than these restrictions, trustees could “say 
anything in the message.” If trustees wished not to send a message they were instructed to 
“simply click on the send button without having typed anything in the message box.” The 
computer conveyed the trustee’s message and subsequently the standardized promise to the 
investor, and then game 2 proceeded. We specified that game 2, which had the same rules as 
game 1, was the last game in the experimental session.  
We classified whether messages from our study were apology (or not) using an 
incentivized laboratory coordination game (Houser & Xiao 2011). Three coders recruited from 
the subject pool and blind to the hypotheses
6
 were asked to code each message based on whether 
or not it conformed to a broad definition of apology (“an explicit or implicit acknowledgment of 
offense”). All messages without content were coded by all coders as not conforming to the 
                                               
6 The instructions for coders, details about how they were paid, and their earning from the incentivized task are 
reported in Schniter, Sheremeta, and Sznycer (2013). 
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definition of apology and 93% of messages with content were coded by the majority of coders as 
conforming to the definition, a “substantial” inter-coder agreement (Kappa of 0.70).7 
 
3.2. Hypotheses 
When deciding whether to re-extend trust, it is important for an investor to obtain 
accurate information about the propensity of trustees to behave in a trustworthy manner. The 
integrity of a trustee’s previous promise (i.e., its signal value) and the actual returns made on 
investment (ROI) are indicators of trustworthy character (demonstrated in past word and action). 
We hypothesize that these demonstrations of trustworthy character trigger emotional reactions in 
both investor and trustee that better calibrate them for repeated interaction with one another.  
Specifically, we predict that when the signal value (= return – promise) is negative, the 
trustee experiences what we refer to as a promise breaker’s (promise keeper’s) emotional 
reaction: lower (higher) levels of pride and believability, higher (lower) levels of guilt and 
shame. When ROI (= return/send) is greater than one, the trustee experiences a beneficent 
(opportunist) emotional reaction: feeling higher (lower) levels of pride and believability, lower 
(higher) levels of guilt and shame. We expect that together the trustee’s promise breaker 
(keeper) and beneficent (opportunist) emotional reactions inform the trustee’s propensity to 
produce spontaneous re-affirmative or remedial behaviors (constructing messages with content, 
constructing wordier messages with higher word count, and issuing spontaneous apologies) in 
preparation for a subsequent interaction. 
We predict that when the signal value (= return – promise) is negative (positive), the 
investor experiences an emotional reaction to damaged trust (assured trust) characterized by 
higher (lower) levels of anger, disgust, aggravation, frustration, and lower (higher) levels of 
appreciation, contentment, cheerfulness, and happiness. When ROI is greater than one (one or 
less), the investor experiences a benefitted (exploited) emotional reaction: feeling lower (higher) 
levels of anger, disgust, aggravation, frustration, and higher (lower) levels of appreciation, 
contentment, cheerfulness, and happiness. 
We expect that the propensity to re-extend trust in game 2 is informed by the investor’s 
emotional reactions to demonstrated trustworthiness, and some assessment of post-exchange re-
affirmative and remedial messaging (e.g., whether or not there is a message with content, what 
the word count of message is, whether or not an apology was issued) by the trustee after the 
investor’s initial emotional reactions to game 1 interaction outcomes.8 In Figure 1 we provide a 
path model visually representing the above predicted relationships between cues of 
trustworthiness, emotional reactions, messaging behaviors, and the trust re-extension decision. 
                                               
7 We use a standard approach from content analysis methodology to calculate Cohen’s Kappa inter-rater agreement 
coefficient (Cohen 1960; Krippendorff 2004). Kappa values between 0.41 and 0.60 are considered “Moderate” 
agreement, and those above 0.60 indicate “Substantial” agreement (Landis & Koch 1977).  
8 We suspect that investor emotional reactions to trustee re-affirmative and remedial behaviors would also affect our 
model, however we did not survey emotional reactions to either received messages or game 2 promises and are 
therefore unable to account for their partial effects. 
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In addition to the predicted emotional effects on messaging and trust re-extension 
summarized above and in Figure 1, we predict emotional effects on trustee behavior in game 2. 
Specifically, we predict a greater propensity to generate trustworthy cues (e.g., with higher 
signal value and higher ROI) in game 2 among trustees who reported higher levels of emotional 
reaction to game 1 – regardless of reaction valence (i.e., higher levels of feeling proud, 
believable, guilty, and ashamed). Conversely, we expect those reporting less emotional reaction 
to demonstrate less trustworthy behaviors. 
 
Figure 1: Path Model of Predicted Relationship between Variables 
 
4. Results 
4.1. General Overview 
We found no significant differences between the twenty five sessions and report the joint 
results of all 458 participants where appropriate. As seen with similar games, we observed a high 
initial rate of promised cooperation: 95.2% (218/229) of trustees promised investors ROI > 1, 
3.9% (9/229) promised ROI = 1, and 0.8% (2/229) promised ROI < 1. In game 1, there was also 
a high rate of trust in response to the promises: investors trusted 86.7% (189/218) of trustees 
promising ROI > 1 and 22.2% (2/9) promising ROI = 1, but none of those promising ROI < 1. 
Trusting investors from the first game (83.4% of all investors) faced a new set of challenges 
when they interacted with the same trustees again in a second unexpected game. Some of these 
investors decided whether to re-extend trust to trustees who cooperated in the first game by 
delivering a ROI > 1 (which 88.5% did), delivering the returns they promised (which 81.2% did), 
or both. Other investors decided whether to re-extend trust to trustees that did not deliver the 
returns they promised (18.8% of all trusted trustees), or did not deliver a profitable ROI (11.5% 
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of all trusted trustees), or both. A subset of those who decided whether to re-extend trust to non-
cooperators, appear to have also been influenced by their emotional reactions to game 1 and 
subsequent message and apology that were sometimes received. 
Trust and reciprocity decisions from this game are reported in detail in Schniter, 
Sheremeta & Sznycer (2013); however, the role of game outcomes in triggering emotional 
experiences, and the role of emotional experiences in affecting behavior propensity in 
subsequent games was not reported. There was substantial variability in individual reports of the 
emotional states investigated below.
9
 The average reported emotional state (as a result of Trust 
game interactions) had a mean of 2.21 (median = 1, SD = 1.04), near 2 (“a little”). Ratings on 
every emotional state ranged from 1 (“very slightly or not at all”) to 5 (“extremely”). While the 
modal report for most (7/12) emotional states was 1 (“very slightly or not at all”) modes were 
also seen at 3 for believable and 4 for appreciative, content, cheerful, and happy. Reports of 1 
were more frequent for emotional states in the negative set than for the positive set (1968/2292 
versus 400/2292, respectively), contributing to significantly lower intensity of reported negative 
states (M = 1.27, SD = 0.75) than positive states (M = 3.15, SD = 1.34) according to Wilcoxon 
matched-pairs tests (Z = -15.167, p < .001). This pattern of significantly lower reported negative 
states was observed in both Investors (Z = -9.446, p < .001) and Trustees (Z = -11.798, p < .001). 
In this paper, we focus on the explanatory power of the emotional reactions we predict 
based on recalibrational theory. Below we report results indicating the predictable and predictive 
nature of emotional reactions in this unexpectedly repeated interaction. Emotions help explain 
whether participants attempted to use cheap signaling remedially, whether investors decide to re-
extend trust, and whether individuals were more likely to break promises or benefit their 
exchange partners. 
 
4.2. Predicted Emotions 
4.2.1. Trustees: Emotions Predicted by Behavior  
In this section we evaluate whether the positive and negative emotions reported by 
trustees and investors in reaction to game 1 were predicted by demonstrations of trustworthiness 
(signal value, ROI) after being trusted (i.e., invested in). As predicted, after game 1 promise 
breakers reported lower levels of pride and feeling believable and higher levels of guilt and 
shame (than promise keepers): there was a significant difference (t(189) = -5.291, p < .001) in 
reports of pride between promise keepers M = 3.54 (SD = 1.330) and promise breakers M = 2.25 
(SD = 1.273), a significant difference (t(189) = -7.969, p < .001) in reports of feeling believable 
between promise keepers M = 3.54 (SD = 1.191) and promise breakers M =1.81 (SD = 1.091), a 
significant difference (t(189) = -11.238, p < .001) in reports of guilt between promise keepers M 
= 1.12 (SD = 0.446) and promise breakers M = 2.47 (SD = 1.183), and a significant difference 
                                               
9 We refer to reports of the following emotional states: proud, believable, guilty, ashamed, angry, disgusted, 
aggravated, frustrated, appreciative, content, cheerful, happy.  
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(t(189) = -7.878, p < .001) in reports of shame between promise keepers M = 1.06 (SD = 0.346), 
and promise breakers M = 1.83 (SD = 1.000).  
Also consistent with our prediction of a beneficent (opportunist) emotional reaction in 
trustees, after game 1 beneficent trustees delivering ROI > 1 reported higher levels of pride and 
feeling believable and lower levels of guilt and shame (than opportunist trustees delivering lower 
ROIs): there was a significant difference (t(189) = -6.965, p < .001) between reports of pride by 
beneficent M = 3.43 (SD = 1.370) and opportunist trustees M = 2.00 (SD = 1.340), a significant 
difference (t(189) = -6.203, p < .001) between reports of feeling believable by beneficent M = 
3.38 (SD = 1.282) and opportunist trustees M = 2.18 (SD = 1.308), a significant difference 
(t(189) = 4.316, p < .001) between reports of guilt by beneficent M = 1.21 (SD = 0.599) and 
opportunist trustees M =1.73 (SD = 1.205), and a significant difference (t(189) = 5.833, p < 
.001) between reports of shame by beneficent M = 1.09 (SD = 0.391) and opportunist trustees M 
=1.63 (SD = 1.025). 
To evaluate the effect of signal value (the difference between game 1 return and promise) 
on the above emotional reactions we estimated ordered probit models, reported in Table 1. We 
find that trustee emotions (proud, believable, guilty, ashamed) are predicted by signal value of 
the promise. 
 
Table 1: Signal Value of Promise and Trustee Emotions 
Dependent variable Proud Believable Guilty Ashamed 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Return1-Promise1 0.116*** 0.164*** -0.138*** -0.084*** 
 (0.031) (0.028) (0.016) (0.012) 
Observations 191 191 191 191 
Note: *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in parenthesis. Constants are not reported. 
 
To evaluate the effect of ROI (game 1 return divided by promise) on trustee emotional 
reactions we estimated ordered probit models, reported in Table 2. We find that trustee emotions 
(proud, believable, guilty, ashamed) are predicted by ROI. 
 
Table 2: ROI and Trustee Emotions 
Dependent variable Proud Believable Guilty Ashamed 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Return1 / Send1 1.270*** 1.739*** -1.486*** -0.857*** 
 (0.343) (0.317) (0.181) (0.141) 
Observations 191 191 191 191 
Note: *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in parenthesis. Constants are not reported. 
 
4.2.2. Investors: Emotions Predicted by Behavior  
As predicted, after game 1 investors with damaged trust (where return<promise) reported 
higher levels of anger, disgust, aggravation, frustration and lower levels of appreciation, 
contentment, cheerfulness, and happiness (than investors whose trust was not damaged but 
assured with a return ≥ promise). Among negative emotion experiences there were significant 
differences (t(189) = -12.644, p < .001) in reports of anger between investors with assured trust 
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M = 1.26 (SD = 0.625) and damaged trust M = 3.22 (SD = 1.436), significant differences (t(189) 
= -10.645, p < .001) in reports of disgust between investors with assured trust M = 1.14 (SD = 
0.476) and damaged trust M = 2.64 (SD = 1.457), significant differences (t(189) = -11.009, p < 
.001) in reports of aggravation between investors with assured trust M = 1.21 (SD = 0.589) and 
damaged trust M = 2.89 (SD = 1.469), and significant differences (t(189) = -10.051) in reports of 
frustration from investors with assured trust M = 1.26 (SD = 0.615) and damaged trust M = 2.81 
(SD = 1.431). Among positive emotion experiences there were significant differences (t(189) = 
9.071 , p < .001) in reports of appreciation between investors with assured trust M = 3.59 (SD = 
1.283) and damaged trust M = 1.53 (SD = 0.941), significant differences (t(189) = 8.476, p < 
.001) in reports of contentment between investors with assured trust M =3.65 (SD = 1.103) and 
damaged trust M =1.89 (SD = 1.190), significant differences (t(189) = 6.937, p < .001) in reports 
of cheerfulness between investors with assured trust M =3.11 (SD = 1.193) and damaged trust 
M = 1.61 (SD = 1.050), and significant differences (t(189) = 8.491; p < .001) in reports of 
happiness between investors with assured trust M =3.40 (SD = 1.149) and damaged trust M 
=1.64 (SD = 0.990). 
Also consistent with our prediction, lower levels of anger, disgust, aggravation, 
frustration, and higher levels of appreciation, contentment, cheerfulness, and happiness were 
reported after game 1 by investors who had benefitted from a ROI > 1 (as opposed to those 
exploited by lower ROI). Among negative emotion experiences there were significant differences 
(t(189) = 12.337, p < .001) in reports of anger between investors who had benefitted M = 1.36 
(SD = 0.775) and been exploited M = 3.73 (SD = 1.279), significant differences (t(189) = 12.763, 
p < .001) in reports of disgust between investors who had benefitted M = 1.193 (SD = 0.577) and 
been exploited M = 3.23 (SD = 1.343) ), significant differences (t(189) = 12.138, p < .001) in 
reports of aggravation between investors who had benefitted M = 1.27 (SD = 0.67) and been 
exploited M = 3.45 (SD = 1.438), significant differences (t(189) = 11.920, p < .001) in reports of 
frustration between investors who had benefitted M = 1.31 (SD = 0.647) and been exploited M = 
3.41 (SD = 1.436). Among positive emotion experiences there were significant differences 
(t(189) = -7.426, p < .001) in reports of appreciation from investors who had benefitted M =3.45 
(SD = 1.336) and been exploited M = 1.27 (SD = 0.883), significant differences (t(189) = -7.940, 
p < .001) in reports of contentment from investors who had benefitted M = 3.55 (SD = 1.165) 
and been exploited M = 1.50 (SD = 0.913), significant differences (t(189) = -6.568, p < .001) in 
reports of cheerfulness from investors who had benefitted M = 3.03 (SD = 1.222) and been 
exploited M = 1.27 (SD = 0.767), and significant differences (t(189) = -7.304, p < .001) in 
reports of happiness from investors who had benefitted M = 3.29 (SD = 1.202) and been 
exploited M = 1.36 (SD = 0.790). 
To evaluate the effect of signal value of promise on the above investor emotional 
reactions we estimated ordered probit models, reported in Table 3. We find that investor 
emotions (angry, disgusted, aggravated, frustrated, appreciative, content, cheerful, happy) are 
predicted by signal value of the promise, which explains anywhere from 20% to 43% of the 
variance in reports. 
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Table 3: Signal Value of Promise and Investors’ Emotions 
Dependent 
variable 
Angry Disgusted Aggravated Frustrated Appreciative Content Cheerful Happy 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Return1-Promise1 -0.232*** -0.188*** -0.208*** -0.193*** 0.227*** 0.209*** 0.181*** 0.202*** 
(0.019) (0.017) (0.019) (0.018) (0.029) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
R2 0.432 0.397 0.400 0.365 0.248 0.263 0.200 0.244 
Observations 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 
Note: *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in parenthesis. Constants are not reported. 
 
To evaluate the effect of game 1 ROI (the amount return divided by the amount sent) on 
the above investor emotional reactions we estimated ordered probit models, reported in Table 4. 
We find that investor emotions (angry, disgusted, aggravated, frustrated, appreciative, content, 
cheerful, happy) are predicted by ROI which explains anywhere from 22% to 47% of the 
variance in reports. 
Table 4: ROI and Investors’ Emotions 
Dependent 
variable 
Angry Disgusted Aggravated Frustrated Appreciative Content Cheerful Happy 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Return1 / Send1 -2.684*** -2.118*** -2.328*** -2.171*** 2.651*** 2.442*** 2.129*** 2.353*** 
 (0.209) (0.186) (0.205) (0.204) (0.315) (0.279) (0.290) (0.284) 
R2 0.467 0.407 0.405 0.374 0.272 0.288 0.222 0.267 
Observations 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 
Note: *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in parenthesis. Constants are not reported. 
 
4.3. Predictive Emotions 
4.3.1. Trustees: Spontaneous Remedial Behaviors Predicted by Emotions  
Using regression analysis, we evaluated the effects of trustee’s emotional reactions to 
game 1 on measures of their spontaneous remedial behaviors (sending a message with content, 
the word count sent, and inclusion of a spontaneous apology). Table 5 reports how the likelihood 
of message (i.e., whether or not they sent a message with content) depends on different emotions. 
Trustees’ feelings of pride showed a significant relationship with message (Χ2 = 4.308, p = .038). 
Trustees feeling believable, guilt, or ashamed were not predictive of message. 
 
Table 5: Trustees’ Emotions and Message Sending 
Dependent variable Message Message Message Message Message 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Proud 0.269**    0.330** 
 (0.130)    (0.146) 
Believable  0.142   0.121 
  (0.135)   (0.153) 
Guilty   0.285  0.558 
   (0.266)  (0.412) 
Ashamed    0.276 0.027 
    (0.366) (0.536) 
Constant 0.583 0.982** 1.051*** 1.101** -0.759 
 (0.430) (0.452) (0.383) (0.457) (0.844) 
Observations 191 191 191 191 191 
Note: ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
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Table 6 reports how the message word count depends on different emotions. Trustees’ 
feelings of pride did not show a marginally significant relationship with message word count (p 
= .799) nor did their feeling believable (p = .737). Trustees feelings of guilt showed a significant 
positive relationship with word count (β = .240, t(189) = 3.393, p = .001). Likewise, trustees 
feelings of shame showed a significant positive relationship with word count (β =.174, t(189) = 
2.430, p = .016). Next, we conducted a linear regression to evaluate the combined effects of the 
above four emotional reactions on message word count. We can reject the hypothesis that all four 
emotions (specification 5 in Table 6) have no effect on word count (F = 3.695, p = .006, df = 4). 
As a set, the four emotions predicted 7.4% of the variance in word count. 
 
Table 6: Trustees’ Emotions and Message Word Count 
Dependent variable Word Count Word Count Word Count Word Count Word Count 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Proud -0.182    0.398 
 (0.713)    (0.786) 
Believable  0.250   1.119 
  (0.744)   (0.820) 
Guilty   3.963***  5.194*** 
   (1.168)  (1.891) 
Ashamed    3.938** -0.448 
    (1.620) (2.481) 
Constant 13.452*** 12.051*** 7.396*** 8.112*** 1.128 
 (2.557) (2.589) (1.880) (2.187) (4.403) 
Observations 191 191 191 191 191 
Note: ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
Table 7: Trustees’ Emotions and Subsequent Apology 
Dependent variable Apology Apology Apology Apology Apology 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Proud -0.547***    0.103 
 (0.156)    (0.240) 
Believable  -0.990***   -0.752*** 
  (0.200)   (0.248) 
Guilty   1.683***  1.774*** 
   (0.272)  (0.447) 
Ashamed    1.422*** -0.420 
    (0.320) (0.503) 
Constant -0.163 0.839* 4.606*** -3.662*** -2.483*** 
 (0.454) (0.486) (0.564) (0.490) (1.066) 
Observations 191 191 191 191 191 
Note: * significant at 10%, *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
Next, Table 7 reports logistic regression analyses evaluating the effects of trustee 
emotional reactions to game 1 on spontaneous apology. Trustees’ feelings of pride showed a 
significant positive relationship predicting apology, (Χ2 = 13.544, p < .001). Trustees’ feelings of 
believable showed a significant positive relationship predicting apology, (Χ2 = 33.109, p < .001). 
Trustees’ feelings of guilt showed a significant positive relationship predicting apology, (Χ2 = 
56.522, p < .001). Likewise, trustees’ feelings of shame showed a significant positive 
relationship predicting apology, (Χ2 = 26.095, p < .001). Next, we estimated a probit model to 
evaluate the combined effects of the above four emotional reactions on likelihood of apology. 
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We can reject the hypothesis that all four emotions (specification 5 in Table 7) have no effect on 
the likelihood of apology (Χ2 = 68.486, p < .001, df = 4). The Cox & Snell R2 indicates that 
together the four emotions explain 30.1% of the apology variance.  
 
4.3.2. Investors: Trust Re-extension Predicted by Emotions  
In this section we evaluate whether investors’ trust re-extension in game 2 was predicted 
by their emotional reactions to game 1 and by measures of spontaneous remedial behavior 
demonstrated after game 1.  
First, we evaluated whether there was a relationship between each of investors’ negative 
emotional reactions and trust re-extension. Less anger was reported among investors who re-
extended trust in game 2 (M = 1.51, SD = 1.009) and more anger reported among investors who 
did not re-extend trust (M = 2.57, SD = 1.532), a significant difference (t(189) = 4.400, p < 
.001). Less disgust was reported among investors who re-extended trust in game 2 (M = 1.32, SD 
= 0.857) and more disgust reported among investors who did not re-extend trust (M = 2.17, SD = 
1.302), a significant difference (t(189) = 4.168, p < .001). Less aggravation was reported among 
investors who re-extended trust in game 2 (M = 1.40, SD = 0.929) and more aggravation 
reported among investors who did not re-extend trust (M = 2.43, SD = 1.441), a significant 
difference (t(189) = 4.648, p < .001). Finally, less frustration was reported among investors who 
re-extended trust in game 2 (M = 1.42, SD = 0.851) and more frustration reported among 
investors who did not re-extend trust (M = 2.57, SD = 1.532), a significant difference (t(189) = 
5.408, p < .001). As predicted, investors who reacted to game 1 with higher the levels of anger, 
disgust, aggravation, and frustration were less likely to re-extend trust by going IN in game 2. 
Logistic regression analysis indicated that for game 1 investors who trusted, the negative 
emotional predictors as a set reliably distinguish between trust re-extension and no trust re-
extension (Χ2 = 20.080, p < .001, df=4). As a set, the negative emotions predicted 10.0% of the 
variance in trust re-extension. 
Next, we evaluated whether there was a relationship between each of the positive 
emotional reactions and trust re-extension. More appreciation was reported among investors who 
re-extended trust (M = 3.35, SD = 1.406) and less appreciation report among those who did not 
(M = 2.13, SD = 1.486), a significant difference (t(189) = -3.861, p < .001). More contentment 
was reported among investors who re-extended trust (M = 3.45, SD = 1.251) and less 
contentment among those who did not (M = 2.35, SD = 1.369), a significant difference (t(189) = 
-3.904, p < .001). More cheerfulness was reported among investors who re-extended trust (M = 
2.97, SD = 1.283) and less cheerfulness among those who did not (M = 1.78, SD = 0.951), a 
significant difference (t(189) = -4.277, p < .001). Finally, more happiness was reported among 
investors who re-extended trust in game 2 (M = 3.20, SD = 1.255) and less happiness among 
those who did not (M = 2.09, SD = 1.345), a significant difference (t(189) = -3.963, p < .001). As 
predicted, investors who reacted to game 1 with higher levels of appreciation, contentment, 
cheerfulness, and happiness were more likely to re-extend trust in game 2. Logistic regression 
analysis indicated that the investor’s positive emotional predictors (i.e., reactions to game 1) as a 
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set reliably distinguished between those who re-extended trust a second time in game 2 and those 
who did not (Χ2 =19.459 , p=.001 with df=4). As a set, the positive emotions predicted 9.7% of 
the variance in trust re-extension. 
 
Table 8: Investors’ Emotions, Remedial Behavior, and Trust Re-Extension 
Dependent variable In2 In2 In2 In2 In2 In2 In2 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Angry -0.068    -0.067 0.027 -0.143 
 (0.325)    (0.335) (0.342) (0.316) 
Disgusted -0.062    -0.410 -0.450 -0.263 
 (0.360)    (0.395) (0.416) (0.388) 
Aggravated 0.467    0.633 0.356 0.305 
 (0.516)    (0.547) (0.517) (0.516) 
Frustrated -0.858*    -0.856* -0.644* -0.793* 
 (0.471)    (0.499) (0.475) (0.481) 
Appreciative 0.041    0.058 0.101 0.075 
 (0.307)    (0.316) (0.304) (0.309) 
Content -0.101    -0.036 -0.029 -0.076 
 (0.321)    (0.349) (0.332) (0.329) 
Cheerful 0.570    0.515 0.524 0.578 
 (0.375)    (0.392) (0.382) (0.382) 
Happy 0.013    0.037 -0.090 -0.011 
 (0.416)    (0.417) (0.427) (0.417) 
Message  1.611***   1.869**   
  (0.469)   (0.572)   
Word count   0.036   0.051  
   (0.022)   (0.025)  
Apology    -0.560   1.772* 
    (0.553)   (0.931) 
Constant 1.795 2.471*** 1.606*** 2.086*** 2.221* 1.507 2.027 
 (2.253) (0.301) (0.299) (0.250) (1.333) (1.264) (1.277) 
Observations 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 
Note: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
Next, in Table 8 we report estimation results of probit models predicting the propensity to 
re-extended trust in game 2 based on investor emotional reactions (to game 1) and a measure of 
spontaneous remedial behaviors (i.e., either message, word count, or apology). In estimating 
these models, we do not consider a model with multiple measures of these inter-related remedial 
behaviors because it would introduce multicollinearity.
10
 We can reject the hypothesis that all 
eight emotions discussed above and in specification (1) have no effect on the likelihood of trust 
re-extension (Χ2 = 25.065, p = .002, df = 8, Cox Snell R2 = 0.123). Specification (5) of Table 8 
considers these emotions and message to predict trust re-extension (Χ2 = 35.980, p < .001, df = 9, 
Cox Snell R
2
 = 0.172). The change in R
2
 between specification (5) and specification (1) indicates 
that message explains an additional 4.9% of the variance. Specification (6) of Table 8 considers 
emotions and word count to predict trust re-extension (Χ2 = 30.490, p < .001, df = 9, Cox Snell 
R
2
 = 0.148). The change in R
2
 between specification (6) and specification (1) indicates that word 
count explains an additional 2.5% of the variance. Specification (7) of Table 8 considers 
                                               
10 Message, word count, and apology are inter-related: whether or not there is a message (with content) is related to 
word count; whether or not there is apology is related to word count and to message. 
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emotions and apology to predict trust re-extension (Χ2 = 29.432, p = .001, df = 9, Cox Snell R2 = 
0.143). The change in R
2
 between specification (7) and specification (1) indicates that apology 
explains an additional 2% of the variance.  
 
4.3.3. Trustees: Game 2 Signal Value and ROI Predicted by Emotions 
In this section we evaluate whether trustees’ emotional reactions to game 1 are predictive 
of game 2 demonstrations of trustworthiness (game 2 signal value and game 2 ROI). For 
previously trusted trustees who were re-extended trust again in game 2, we estimated linear 
regression models, reported in Table 9, where the dependent variable is game 2 signal value (the 
difference between game 2 return and promise) and the independent variables are the trustee 
emotional reactions to game 1 (pride, believability, guilt, shame). Trustees’ feelings of pride 
showed a significant positive relationship with game 2 signal value (β = .161, t(166) = 2.106, p = 
.037. Trustee feelings of believability also showed a significant positive relationship with game 2 
signal value (β =.153, t(166) = 1.991, p = .048. Trustees feelings of guilt showed a significant 
negative relationship with game 2 signal value (β = -0.292, t(166) = -3.928, p < .001). Likewise, 
trustees feelings of shame showed a significant negative relationship with game 2 signal value (β 
= -.268, t(166) = -3.958, p < .001). Next, we conducted a linear regression to evaluate the 
combined effects of the above four emotional reactions on the signal value of promise made in 
game 2. We can reject the hypothesis that all four emotions (specification 5 in Table 9) have no 
effect on game 2 signal value (F = 4.414, p = .002, df = 4).  
 
Table 9: Trustees’ Emotions and Game 2 Signal Value 
Dependent variable 
Return2- 
Promise2 
Return2- 
Promise2 
Return2- 
Promise2 
Return2- 
Promise2 
Return2- 
Promise2 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Proud 0.443**    0.182 
 (0.210)    (0.226) 
Believable  0.432**   0.147 
  (0.217)   (0.234) 
Guilty   -1.381***  -0.817 
   (0.351)  (0.585) 
Ashamed    -1.799*** -0.720 
    (0.501) (0.801) 
Constant -3.027*** -2.945*** 0.309 0.575 -0.701 
 (0.443) (0.768) (0.542) (0.647) (1.242) 
Observations 168 168 168 168 168 
Note: ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
Next, we estimate a linear regression model, reported in Table 10, where the dependent 
variable is game 2 ROI (game 2 return divided by game 2 amount sent) and the independent 
variables are the trustee emotional reactions to game 1. Trustees feelings of pride and 
believability showed no relationship with game 2 signal value (p = .641 and p = .641, 
respectively). Trustees feelings of guilt showed a significant negative relationship with game 2 
signal value (β = -.169, t(166) = -2.214, p = .028). Trustees feelings of shame showed a 
significant negative relationship with game 2 signal value (β = -.157, t(166) = -2.046, p = .042). 
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We cannot reject the hypothesis that all four emotions (specification 5 in Table 10) have no 
effect on ROI in game 2 (F = 1.345, p = 0.256, df = 4). 
 
Table 10: Trustees’ Emotions and Game 2 ROI 
Dependent variable 
Game 2 
ROI 
Game 2 
ROI 
Game 2 
ROI 
Game 2 
ROI 
Game 2 
ROI 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (6) 
Proud 0.041    0.022 
 (0.039)    (0.043) 
Believable  0.019   -0.015 
  (0.040)   (0.045) 
Guilty   -0.148**  -0.104 
   (0.067)  (0.112) 
Ashamed    -0.194** -0.074 
    (0.095) (0.153) 
Constant 1.547*** 1.622*** 1.881*** 1.911*** 1.886*** 
 (0.143) (0.143) (0.103) (0.123) (0.238) 
Observations 168 168 168 168 168 
Note: ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
In this study we examined how participants who were given no indication of subsequent 
interactions, experienced emotions after participating in a trust game, and how such emotions 
influenced subsequent behaviors when another opportunity for trust-based exchange arose. We 
found that emotions triggered by trust-based interaction outcomes are predictable and also 
predict subsequent messaging, apology, and trust re-extension. These findings advance our 
understanding of human behavior and they contribute to several areas of research. 
First, our study provides support for the recalibrational theory of emotions (Tooby & 
Cosmides 1990; Schniter & Shields 2013; Schniter, Sheremeta & Shields 2013). According to 
this theory, new information about outcomes triggers emotions, and, when experienced, these 
emotions regulate subsequent behavior. In support of this theory, we find that positive emotions 
experienced after successful trust-based interaction motivate the investor to trust the trustee’s 
cheap signals (re-extend trust) and motivate the beneficent, promise keeper trustees to issue 
shorter re-affirmative messages (word count M=6.33, SD = 10.970)
11
 and demonstrate more 
trustworthiness. Alternatively, a trustee’s negative emotional reaction to acting untrustworthy 
                                               
11 Space precludes a full content analysis, but cursory inspection reveals that these messages tend to be re-
affirmative – calling attention to the successful exchange and intention to repeat it. Examples include “teamwork!”, 
“same deal.”, “same as last time :)”, “we’re a good pair. I don’t know what else to say haha.”, “same thing?”, “lets 
do this!”, “Pleasure doing business with you”, “I will keep it equal like last time”, “Let’s just do the same transfer 
again”, “Let’s do the same… It worked and we both made some money!!!”, “Same deal as before sounds about 
right, in my opinion”, “Let’s do the same thing, that way we both get the max amount of money”, “Same thing 
again. We both benefit.”, “I like the way we did it last time, it works out nicely for both of us and it’s fair :) Thanks 
for being great!”, “Heyo- happy to work with you again ¶ and do the same thing.”, “well we worked together so far- 
want to do it again? at least we’ll both make more than $5”. Interested readers are encouraged to further examine the 
message content in Appendix B. 
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(breaking a promise and exploiting the investor), motivates remedial efforts like longer messages 
(word count M= 19.06, SD = 19.031) and apology targeting the affected investor. 
Second, our study provides an explanation for why “cheap-talk” (i.e., communication not 
necessarily affecting incentives, Farrell & Rabin, 1996) is produced despite normative prediction 
and why these kinds of messages are often effective. Though cheap-to-produce signals are not 
guaranteed to be reliable and thus unexpected to persuade receivers (Zahavi 1993; Grafen 1990), 
they are frequently used by humans in the form of spoken or written words to negotiate trust 
between individuals with conflicting interests (Lachmann et al. 2001). Our study suggests that 
cheap-to-produce messages are reliable because they are backed up by emotions. For example, 
we find that positive emotional responses by trustees decrease the likelihood of apology and the 
length of message. On the other hand, negative emotional responses increase the likelihood of 
apology and the length of message. Not only do emotions predict the use of cheap-to-produce re-
affirmative and remedial messages, but they also predict the subsequent behavior of trustees. In 
principal, investors who have access to and understand the dynamics of these emotional 
responses and communicative intentions should be able to reliably predict the behavior of 
trustees based on their messages (and by extension, predict the honesty of their messages).  
Finally, our study shows that damaged trust can be rebuilt with remedial behaviors 
(spontaneous messaging with apology), with emotions guiding behavioral propensities. This is 
an important finding, given that breaches of trust are a common problem in economic 
relationships and corporate life (Robinson & Rousseau 1994; Barnett 2003). 
Emotional experiences reported by our participants explain as much as 30.1% of their 
subsequent behavior. That the studied emotions did not predict more of the observed variance in 
messaging or trust re-extension may be a consequence of the unexplained variance in reported 
experience of emotions. Our model based on game 1 antecedents explained between 20% and 
47% of the variance in reports of each of the twelve emotional states studied, with more variance 
explained for the negative emotion states that were generally experienced with lower intensity. 
Below we consider whether some of the variance in emotional reports might be explained by 
differing interpretations of the emotion labels, design limitations of the survey instrument, or 
deliberately compromised reporting fidelity. 
People who are asked to rate single emotions may not be able to accurately describe their 
emotional states (Ellsworth and Tong 2006) if emotion experiences are more often and 
accurately described with multiple words (Izard 1977), or with different words among different 
people. While we acknowledge that language could present problems for this research and have 
no controls, the success of previous research on self-reported emotions in conjunction with 
experimental games (Ketelaar and Au 2003) gave us encouragement in pursuing measures of 
self-reported emotions following an economic game. Nevertheless, analysis of variance in 
emotion reports revealed a “floor effect” that might have resulted from language limitations, 
difficulty identifying and reporting emotional states, a problem with the instrument used, and 
untruthful reports. 
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Consistent with the design of PANAS instruments (Watson et al. 1988) – the most widely 
used surveys of emotional states, our emotional status survey defined response option “1”, the 
lowest response possible on the five point Likert, with a label combining two state levels: “not at 
all” and “very slightly”. By combining both state levels into a single response option, a larger 
proportion of response types from the possible spectrum (not at all to always) may accumulate at 
that value, suggesting that the problems of explaining variance in emotional reports might be 
linked to low-variance floor effects in response patterns. Never the less, we were able to explain 
more variance among our negative emotions that participants reported lower intensity experience 
of (than among positive emotions that were reported as experienced more intensely). Future 
research should consider restructuring the response options and testing whether a different 
distribution of responses results. 
Data quality could also have been affected if participants were primed by the stimulus to 
experience specific emotions (e.g., as a consequence of experimenter demand) or made 
untruthful reports. Demand effects to provide inflated reports of the emotional states specifically 
studied in this report is unlikely because we surveyed a larger set of twenty emotional states and 
did not reveal the subset of emotional states that we were particularly interested in analyzing. 
Another concern is that participants may not have viewed the emotion survey as “incent ive 
compatible” and thus been motivated to answer untruthfully. A meta-review by Camerer and 
Hogarth (1999) concludes that there is no clear evidence that additional financial incentives 
would improve the quality of responses in a simple survey task like ours. In fact, for short tasks 
like these surveys that people are known to voluntarily complete without problem (because they 
have sufficient intrinsic motivation to do so), an attempt at increasing participation via financial 
incentives often “backfires” with counter-intentional effects (e.g., Mellstrom and Johannesson 
2008). Nevertheless, wary of the possibility that participants may have been incentivized to use 
efficiency tactics to expediently complete the survey (such as by quickly marking all responses 
the same), we reviewed our data and found no cases of such behavior. 
For the past couple millennia scholars have recognized that emotions indeed matter in our 
everyday lives, but have argued over issues of whether and how emotions guide behavior. 
Perhaps because of previous confusion or disagreement, the study of emotions has been 
neglected and deserves greater attention in behavioral economics and interpersonal relationships. 
By triangulating with more objective neurological, physiological, and behavioral measures of 
emotional states some of the discussed limitations of itemized self-reports could potentially be 
overcome. This study provides evidence that consequences of the behaviors we choose and 
experience predict the emotions we feel and that, in turn, the emotions we feel influence our 
propensity towards subsequent behaviors. These findings suggest that there is hope for a future 
where people better understand the role that emotions play in relationships.  
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Appendix A: Instructions for the Trust Game 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Thank you for participating in this experiment. The purpose of this experiment is to study how people make 
decisions in a particular situation. Feel free to ask us questions as they arise, by raising your hand. Please do not 
speak to other participants during the experiment. You will receive $7 for participating in this session. You may also 
receive additional money, depending on the decisions made (as described below). Upon completion of the session, 
this additional amount will be paid to you individually and privately.  
During the session, you will be paired with another person. However, no participant will ever know the identity 
of the person with whom he or she is paired. 
 
DECISION TASKS 
 
In each pair, one person will have the role of A, and the other will have the role of B. The amount of money you 
earn depends on the decisions made in your pair. 
First, by choosing a dollar amount from $0 to $20, B indicates the proportion of a possible $20 income that he 
or she promises to transfer back to A, should A choose IN. Specifically, B will complete the following statement: “I 
(Participant B) promise to transfer back ___ of my income to you (Participant A) if you choose IN”. The computer 
will convey B’s statement to A, and then A and B will proceed as described below. B may still choose an amount to 
transfer back to A that is different than the amount promised. 
Having received a statement from B, A indicates whether he or she chooses IN or OUT. If A chooses OUT, A 
receives $5 and B receives $0. If A chooses IN, then B receives $20 income. In such a case, after receiving $20 
income, B must choose a dollar amount from $0 to $20 to transfer back to A.   
 
SURVEY 
 
After having completed the decision tasks described above you will be asked to fill out a short 20 item survey. 
 
DIAGRAM 
 
The following diagram represents how the experiment proceeds:  
 
 
  
B makes a promise: 
“I (Person B) promise to transfer back 
___ of my income to you (Person A) if 
you choose IN” 
A chooses: IN or OUT 
IN OUT 
promise 
B chooses: the amount ($X) from $0 
to $20 to transfer back to A. 
amount X 
A’s Earnings: $5 
B’s Earnings: $0 
A’s Earnings: $X 
B’s Earnings: $20-$X 
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(This part of the instructions was handed out after the first part of the experiment was conducted.) 
 
REPETITION OF THE EXPERIMENT 
 
The same decision tasks that were just completed will be repeated again, with everyone remaining in the same 
A or B roles and paired with the same participants as in the previous tasks. 
 
MESSAGE 
 
Prior to repetition of the previous decision tasks, B has an option to send a message to A. B may use a text box 
to type a message, if desired. We will allow time as needed to construct and type messages. When B’s message has 
been completed (by typing in the text box and clicking on the send button) it will be conveyed by the computer to 
the appropriate Participant A, and then A and B will proceed with decision tasks. In these messages, no one is 
allowed to identify him or herself by name, number, gender, or appearance. Other than these restrictions, B may say 
anything in the message. If you wish not to send a message, simply click on the send button without having typed 
anything in the message box. 
 
DECISION TASKS AND SURVEY (REPEATED AS BEFORE) 
 
This second set of decision tasks and the accompanying 20 item survey is the final part of the experiment. There 
will be no further tasks. 
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Appendix B: Promises and Messages 
Table B1: Promise-Breakers Messages 
Promised 
Game 1 
Returned 
Game 1 
Message  Word-
count 
Broad 
Apology 
Promised 
Game 2 
Trusted? 
Game 2 
Returned 
Game 2 
15 0 Let's split even. $10 and $10. 6 YES 10 YES 8 
10 1 
 
 
 
 
If I knew there were 2 rounds I would have split it 
up even the first round.  This round I'll make it up 
to you by giving you 15 if you're IN, this way we 
both end up with more money.  Sorry again. 
43 
 
 
 
 
YES 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
 
 
 
YES 
 
 
 
 
3 
10 0 
 
 
Hey im sorry about that I didn't realize there was 
going to be another round.! Let me make things 
right. 
20 
 
 
 
YES 
 
 
 
15 
 
 
 
YES 
 
 
 
5 
10 9 i'll do the same deal as last time, sound fair? 10 NO 15 YES 9 
10 7 to even out i will give you 13 and i will take 7 13 YES 13 YES 10 
10 0 
 
 
 
 
dooooooood we all here to make muney baby so 
why dont we just split this huney down da middle,  
a lil lovin for da both of us? ill forrealze give you 
like 10 bucks and ill keep 10 you dig? stay fresh ;) 
43 
 
 
 
 
YES 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
 
 
 
YES 0 
10 7 How much would you want this time seeing how 
you didn't have a choice last time? I'm willing to 
make it even between the two of us. 
27 YES 13 YES 0 
10 5 Hello A! I'm sorry I fell back on my promise, haha. 
To be honest, I'm dead broke and I haven't eaten 
all day and I'm literally about to run out of gas in 
my car, and those extra five dollars are going to 
help me out with that!  ¶ If you choose out the 
most you are going to get is 5 more dollars, I can 
promise you that I'll agree to give you $10 if you 
choose in. Hopefully this works out! Either way, 
have a good one! 
88 YES 12 YES 12 
8 5 I only sent less than promised because I wanted to 
see what would happen 
14 YES 10 YES 10 
10 2 Hi, I was a little confused as to the experiment 
before. But I will stay true to this promise 
19 YES 9 YES 9 
13 9 lets split the money 10 and 10 7 YES 10 YES 10 
10 8 I apologize for cheating you out of your $2 - 
normally I'm not the kind of person to do that sort 
of thing. When two people aren't face-to-face they 
usually have more confidence to do things they 
wouldn't normally do. This time I promise I'll play 
fair. 
47 YES 9 YES 9 
10 7 I didn't know we were repeating this. This time I 
really will split 50/50 :) 
15 YES 10 YES 10 
11 2 I will transfer back 18 to you this time to make it 
fair ¶  so we will have the same amount. I promise 
this time. 
24 YES 18 YES 10 
14 11 Hi. I apologize for short changing you.  I should 
have been honsest and gone off the first example.  
I went off the third example w/my self interest in 
mind.  I'll keep my word this time. 
35 YES 18 YES 18 
11 10 10/10? 1 YES 12 YES 7 
8 0 sorry about last time i feel bad......50/50  this time? 10 YES 10 YES 0 
8 7 Strategy :) 1 YES 10 YES 10 
10 0 I feel bad that you now only have the option of 
going home with $5 so you should click in again 
and i will give you $12 so that you go home with 
more than just the basic amount possible 
40 YES 12 YES 0 
8 6 My sincerest appologies on that last one...I do feel 
quite guilty ¶  and I assure you that this time I shall 
keep my promise with utmost integrity.  You have 
34 YES 16 YES 1 
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my word as an honest gentleman. 
10 7 I feel bad for promising 10 and giving you 7. If 
you choose in I'll send you 13 so that we'll come 
out even. 
24 YES 13 YES 13 
5 1 my bad... 2 YES 10 YES 8 
10 3 I'll transfer back more money this time ¶  actually 
$10 
9 YES 11 YES 10 
10 8 Hi ¶ I was testing if it really will let me decide how 
much I can get myself. This time I will give you 
the right amount I promised. 
28 YES 10 YES 10 
10 0   0 NO 20 YES 0 
10 0 This time I'll give you what I promise.  Sorry! 9 YES 10 NO  
10 0 ok for real this time haha. The first time was a joke 
lol 
13 YES 15 NO  
17 0 May God bless you 4 NO 13 NO  
10 7 In the previous exercise I wanted to see if one 
really could promise one amount and then give 
another. After seeing that it is possible, I promise 
to give you the amount I state. 
34 YES 10 NO  
17 1 i know that there is no reason you'd trust me 
because i didn't follow through with my promise 
last time ¶ but if you choose in i will transfer all of 
the money that i say i will. ¶ for real this time. 
41 YES 18 NO  
10 5 Even though I was decietful ¶ you were no worse 
off then had you picked OUT.  The other option 
would have still led you to $5. 
25 YES 5 NO  
12 5  0 NO 20 NO  
18 4  0 NO 12 NO  
7 6  0 NO 9 NO  
10 5  0 NO 8 NO  
10 7  0 NO 10 NO  
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Table B2: Distrusted Trustees Messages 
Promised  
Game 1 
Message Word-
count 
Promised 
Game 2 
Trusted? 
Game 2 
Returned 
Game 2 
11 8 seems fair 3 8 YES 0 
16 lets go 50/50. i give you $10, i get $10. ¶ its almost christmas.... 13 10 YES 1 
9 I want to split the money right down the middle. I will give you ten dollars 
and I will get ten dollars.  If you choose out you will get less and both of us 
will come out empty handed. This is for the benefit of both parties and you 
will make more money in this way than you will by opting out. 
62 10 YES 1 
5 hey if i transfer 9 to you will you accept ? 11 9 YES 8 
10 Trust me this time. Please? 5 10 YES 7 
10 hi! i was actually going to give you the $10 that time! You would have made 
more money! I promise to give what I promise to you this time as well! 
31 8 YES 5 
11 Hello, ¶ I think $11.00 for you is a fair price for this survey and it is more than 
the $5.00 you get for choosing Out. I will keep my offer the same if you chose 
In. ¶ Thank you 
37 11 YES 12 
10 Hey! Okay, listen, I was genuinely going to give you ten dollars. I think it 
makes sense for both of us to make as much money as possible. I'm not trying 
to trick you. I'm just poor and want a few extra dollars to buy Christmas 
presents. So could you please just be in" next time? That way we can both 
make more. I promise I am not lying to you. I know it's anonymous but please 
trust me. :(" 
80 9 YES 10 
6 You click out,  you earn 5. You accept my offer,  you earn 6. It doesn't make 
any sense to click OUT. This is not a situation where my gain affects your 
profits in the future, this isn't one business earning a little bit and another 
earning a lot at its expense. You have to option of $6 or $5,  without 
repercussions or any damage in the future. Me getting 0 does you no good,  all 
it does is hurt you. If you want $5,  click OUT. But it obviously makes more 
sense to click IN. 
95 6 YES 7 
1 If I offer you at least 30% of my income we both make more than if you opt 
out. 
19 7 YES 7 
8 How about 10? We will both make the same amount evenly. 11 10 YES 10 
10 I am a person of my word. I will transfer back $10 so we both make the same 
amount of money and more money than if you pick OUT 
29 10 YES 10 
10 I will offer 10 dollars of my income to you. If you choose in, then you will 
recieve 10 dollars and i will recieve 10 dollars. If you choose out, you will 
only recieve 5 dollars. 
36 10 YES 10 
20 I will split it with you so we both get ten dollars. 12 10 YES 10 
6  0 9 YES 9 
6 Please trust me when I say I will give you the amount I will promise you. This 
way, we will both earn more money instead of you just earnint $5 and me 
earning nothing. Let's take all of their money together! 
41 7 YES 7 
5 I will transfer 10 dollars. 5 10 YES 10 
5 Hey ¶  to make this a win-win situation for both of us ¶  I'll transfer $10 and 
that way both of us will earn the same amount. It's really a good gameplan. :) 
31 0 YES 8 
7 Ok ¶  so this time let's make it actually fair.... I should have made it even last 
time. So this time if I give you back $8 ¶  you'll leave with $20 and I'll leave 
with $19. you still come out on top ¶  but I don't mind. And that's more than 
you'll make if you click OUT. I'm in the same boat as you....I too am poor as 
hell and would like to make some easy cash.... 
75 8 YES 8 
20 I will transfer you back 75% back. 7 10 YES 0 
5 We can figure out a way to divide the amount of the $20 equally if the result 
from that will have us leave here with more than $7 
28 10 YES 9 
10 I won't ask you to trust me.  That's your choice ¶  what I will say though is 
offer you $10 to each of us.  We both walk away from this evenly and both  
better off than we came in. 
38 10 YES 10 
4 I promise to transfer back 20 of my income to you. I really need this extra 
money. I hope you understand 
21 20 YES 0 
9 Let's be fair and split the pool evenly. Trust that I will not go back on what I 
say. 
19 10 YES 10 
6 I will give you half of the amount of the income 11 12 YES 0 
5 Hello A ¶ I'm stoked to be making money while my roomate snores away. 
Hahaha. ¶ Cha-ching ly ¶ B.¶ 
16 4 YES 4 
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20 if i say $20 and you accpet ¶ I promise to give you $20 back so we both leave 
with $20 ¶  the max amount 
23 20 YES 20 
8 I promise to uphold any deals set before me 9 10 YES 10 
6 I promise to give you $7 for clicking "in." I guarantee it. As I see it ¶  this 
gives you $2 more dollars than you would recieve by clicking "out." It's a 
win-win situation. 
33 7 YES 7 
8  0 10 YES 0 
5 I think you should choose IN because it is simple game theory. If you choose 
IN and I choose to give you $10 ¶  which I promise to give you ¶  then we 
both win.  I know that you would automatically want to choose OUT so that 
you can get $5 no matter what ¶  but I promise you that you will get $10. We 
both want to get money ¶  and this is a good way to share our earnings. I hope 
you choose IN! :) 
83 5 YES 0 
10 If I offered you 10$ why would you rather get 5? 11 10 YES 10 
6 Ouch. ): I'm not gonna scam you, dude. When I make a promise, I make a 
promise. We both make more money this way; it's good all around! 
28 6 NO  
5 hey Participant a make a deal dont do like this we should come here to earn 
money kul 
18 1 NO  
10 dont be an asshole 4 7 NO  
10 Trust me. 2 10 NO  
6 You'll get more than $5. 5 8 NO  
8 Hello there! So it's probably hard to trust me ¶  in that I will return your 
money? And I would quite frankly feel the same way. The thing is though that 
you don't know me but I know me and I know that when I make a promise I 
keep it. I hope you can trust in me. :) 
58 7 NO  
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Table B3: Promise-Keepers Messages 
Promised Returned Message Word-
count 
Promised 
Game 2 
Trusted? 
Game 2 
Returned 
Game 2 
6 14 I paid out more than I promised to transfer back the first time as a 
reward for going IN 
19 10 YES 0 
6 6 merry christmas! 2 10 YES 10 
10 10 Same deal as before sounds about right, in my opinion. 10 10 YES 10 
8 8 i guess you need the money too so we should split it! 12 10 YES 10 
10 10 Hey there. Want to do the same thing again,  and both come out 
ahead? 
14 10 YES 10 
9 9 hey so 10 and 10 this time? 7 10 YES 10 
10 10 I will split it equally 5 10 YES 10 
10 10 Thanks for accepting my last offer. I promise to always uphold 
my side of the deal. 
16 10 YES 10 
9 9 hello A! :) 3 7 YES 7 
7 7 I won't lie to you. I know we're all broke college students here 
who need to make money. ugh 
19 8 YES 8 
10 10 This is tres bizarre. 4 10 YES 10 
5 5 i send you 10 and you hit in..that way we both get the same 
amount of money. =] 
19 10 YES 10 
10 10 Let's do the same thing,  that way we both get the max amount of 
money 
15 10 YES 0 
10 10 we'll go 50/50 on everything. i promise. 7 10 YES 10 
6 6 we're a good pair. i dont know what else to say haha. 12 6 YES 1 
11 11 expecto patronum! 2 11 YES 2 
10 10 Pleasure doing business with you :) 6 10 YES 10 
9 9 :) I dont know what to say haha but ill split it 50 50 this time for 
you 
18 10 YES 10 
10 10 Let's make some MONEY :) click in on all of them and i'll try and 
make it as fair as possible. 
21 10 YES 10 
9 9 I hope you are satisfied with the amount of money I offered you.  
I will offer more this time. 
19 10 YES 10 
10 10 I don't really have anything to say...let's split the money 10-10 
again 
13 10 YES 10 
10 10 $10 is better than $5. Trust me, I'm a doctor haha 11 10 YES 10 
6 6  0 6 YES 6 
7 7 I will do exactly the same thing as I did before. 11 7 YES 7 
10 10 Lets split it 11/ 9 everytime, that way we both get more money IN 
than OUT? sound good? I don't think you can answer me. . . 
27 9 YES 9 
6 6 Again I will promise $6. Please choose IN as it will maximize the 
profit that both of us can potentially made. I promise that I will 
send the full amount and if we can trust each other i will increase 
the amount I send in the following round. Thank you. 
50 6 YES 6 
10 10 Same as last time? It's only fair we earn the same amount. 12 10 YES 10 
10 10 hi. i think it's best when we split it! makes it fair for everyone 14 10 YES 10 
10 10 ill give u ten everytime if you choose IN then we both get ten 
dollars everytime we both go home with the same amount of 
money. again ten dollars a piece everytime go home with same 
amt. :) 
38 10 YES 10 
10 10  0 10 YES 10 
6 6 want to choose in and then we take half? 10 each? 11 10 YES 10 
8 8  0 8 YES 8 
10 10 Let's keep going 50/50 4 10 YES 10 
7 7 I promise to transfer you more money than last time. 10 9 YES 9 
9 9 Hi, hope you're content with the $9 7 10 YES 10 
10 10 Let's split the 20 evenly, 10-10 6 10 YES 10 
10 10 Want to just split it again? 6 10 YES 10 
10 10 same thing as before, we both might as well walk out with enough 
for gas money! 
16 10 YES 10 
10 10 same thing? 2 10 YES 10 
9 9  0 9 YES 9 
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10 10 I will keep it equal like last time. 8 10 YES 10 
8 10  0 7 YES 9 
9 9  0 9 YES 9 
8 8 Same as before Ill send you 8. We both get more $$ that way! 14 8 YES 0 
10 10 Same deal. 2 10 YES 10 
10 10  0 10 YES 10 
8 8  0 8 YES 5 
10 10 i promise to do 50/50 again 6 10 YES 10 
8 8  0 8 YES 8 
8 8 hey, so i just want you to know that i'll probably sent you $8 or 
$9! nice working with you! 
20 8 YES 8 
10 10 I like the way we did it last time, it works out nicely for both of us 
and it's fair :) ¶ Thanks for being great! 
24 10 YES 10 
10 10 I will be fair. 4 10 YES 10 
6 6 Hi A! :) 3 9 YES 6 
8 8 I'm going to do the same thing. 7 8 YES 9 
9 9 I hope you're having a great day! 7 8 YES 8 
9 9 Teamwork! 1 10 YES 10 
10 10 I promise not to screw you out of any money and to transfer back 
what I say I will. If you choose in¶ we'll both benefit more! =D¶ 
28 8 YES 8 
10 10 Don't worry, we'll evenly split the money this time, too, just like 
last time. I won't try to scam you or anything, because that's 
below me. You'll get the 10 dollars that I promise you. :) 
36 10 YES 10 
10 10 I'm not a risk taker and I'm not a dick. I said I'd give back ten 
before, and I did. We both want money. You can make $5 or $10 
because I will give you ten again. yayyy money=)) 
39 10 YES 10 
10 10 If we do this again, i'm always going to keep it equal for both of 
us. 
16 10 YES 10 
10 10 Hi, so I know it's hard to trust someone who you don't even know 
but I'll be I'll do my best to make things work. 
25 9 YES 9 
10 10 I figure we are both equally desperate for cash. 9 10 YES 10 
9 9 Hi Participant A ¶ I hope you trust me due to the previous round. 
I will take care of you and uphold to my promises, if you take 
care of me. Deal? Now lets do this and make some bank! ¶ ¶ 
Signed, ¶ Participant B 
41 10 YES 10 
8 8 I'm going to offer $8 again. Hopefully you choose IN. That way 
we can both make a profit. 
18 8 YES 8 
10 10 Have you ever done this before? 6 10 YES 10 
10 10  0 10 YES 10 
10 10 Same thing? Seems fair? ... 4 10 YES 10 
9 9 i promise i will give you what i say i will 11 10 YES 10 
10 10 Thanks, glad we're both making a good amount of money! It's 
tough starting us off though! Wish you the best! 
20 10 YES 5 
10 10 Hello. Hope this doesn't sound creepy or anything. I think we 
should work together to get out of here with the same amount of 
money. I'm going to send over 10 again. :) 
33 10 YES 10 
10 10 I think each of us getting 10 dollars is fair. do you agree? 13 10 YES 10 
8 8 same as last time :) 5 8 YES 8 
9 9  0 9 YES 9 
10 10 You can trust me :) 5 10 YES 10 
10 10 Keep it even again 4 10 YES 10 
10 10 i chose to give $10 dollars and gave you $10 in that last part. i 
hope we get paid 
19 10 YES 10 
10 10 I'm going to do the same thing as last time, 10 for you and 10 for 
me. We both would then walk away with 27 dollars :) 
27 10 YES 10 
8 8  0 8 YES 8 
9 9  0 9 YES 9 
10 10 Hope you like the wind.... 5 10 YES 10 
8 8 Were you happy with the outcome? 6 9 YES 9 
10 10 Hey if you accept the $10 then we both make that everytime and 
thats the most mutually beneficial. 
18 10 YES 10 
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10 10 Same thing again. We both benefit. 6 10 YES 10 
10 10 hi! let's split the money 50/50 and each get 10 every time 12 10 YES 10 
7 7  0 7 YES 7 
10 10 Thanks for choosing IN :) hopefully if we do the same thing again 
we'll both make $20 each? thanks! 
19 10 YES 10 
10 10 Hello ¶  I wanted to make things 50/50. I don't really understand 
but that seemed fair to me at least 
19 10 YES 10 
7 7 I have no idea what to say here. This is a nice text box? 14 8 YES 1 
9 9 I believe example 1 seemed the fairest for the position i was 
given. I did not want to be unfair however it seemed necessary to 
try and make a profit. I chose the smallest profit option which 
gave us both money in the end. 
44 9 YES 9 
10 10 I'll give you $10 just like before if you say "IN." ¶ It's a win-win 
(I get $10 instead of $0 and you get $10 instead of $5 if you were 
to say "OUT." 
32 10 YES 10 
7 7 I need a nap... 4 11 YES 10 
10 10 Let's just do that same transfer again 7 10 YES 10 
8 8 =] 1 9 YES 9 
10 10 Hi there ¶  just trying to keep things equal and honest ¶ now let's 
get some solid earnings again! :) 
18 10 YES 10 
8 8 This is a haiku. ¶ I am glad you trusted me¶ This way we both 
win! 
13 8 YES 10 
7 7  0 8 YES 8 
9 9 Please remember that if you say OUT ¶  you only get $5. I 
PROMISE you that I will not give you under that if you say IN ¶  
I promise. 
28 7 YES 6 
10 10 You're in good hands. Win/win. 5 10 YES 10 
10 10 I want to keep this fair and even! 8 10 YES 10 
10 10  0 10 YES 10 
9 9 I'm glad you trusted me and went with IN ¶  I'm gonna do the 
same thing again so hopefully you go with IN again :) 
24 9 YES 9 
10 10 hi. i liked how we did it the first time. hopefully u did too 14 10 YES 0 
10 10 I will send you 10 if you select IN ¶ 10 10 YES 10 
9 9 $6 is the minimum offer to accept...anything higher your making 
more $ just off genorosity 
15 10 YES 6 
10 10  0 10 YES 10 
9 9 Good deal! I'll up the transfer a to make it a litte more fair 14 10 YES 0 
9 9 This time I'm going to promise 11 back to you ¶  and since you've 
seen I keep my promise ¶  when you click IN I will give you back 
11 so we both walk out of here with 20. I don't break promises. 
41 11 YES 11 
9 9 50/50 ¶  sound good? 3 10 YES 10 
10 10  0 10 YES 10 
8 8 I'll give you exactly what I promise 7 10 YES 10 
6 7  0 10 YES 8 
10 10 just wanted to say hello :) have a nice day! 9 10 YES 10 
10 10 Heyo- happy to work with you again ¶  and do the same thing. 12 10 YES 10 
10 10 Hi! I'm going to split the money evenly. Have a nice day! 12 10 YES 10 
9 9 Let's split it half and half ¶  ten dollars. 8 10 YES 10 
10 10 Hello "A". Based on our last experiment we have established trust 
¶  so thanks for making that happen!  I will repeat the same steps 
as last time to ensure that we both get the same amount of money 
at our maximum level ¶  10$ each.it makes no sense to betray 
each other because we just come out of this thing with less money 
on both parts. Lets get rich!! 
67 10 YES 1 
10 10 im going to offer you 10 again ¶  take it and we can profti equally 14 10 YES 0 
9 9 Hey just to let you know ¶  I try my best to never lie in life and I 
include this experiment part of my life standard so I won't lie. 
29 6 YES 6 
10 10 Hey. same amount ¶  same money ¶  we both leave with 27 buck 
in our pocket. =] 
15 10 YES 10 
10 10 Teamwork + Honesty = $$$$¶ 3 8 YES 8 
7 7 I Hate Mondays¶                         -Garfield 4 17 YES 16 
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10 10  0 10 YES 10 
8 8 Hey! So I want to make money ¶  just as much as you do ¶  so 
why dont we call it even and I promise $10 ¶  you accept ¶  and 
we get out of here! =D Thanks 
34 10 YES 10 
10 10 Pay it forward. ¶ Have a great day. 7 10 YES 10 
7 7  0 7 YES 7 
10 10 Yay! great teamwork last time. I think we should do the same 
thing again this time. That way we both get the maximum amount 
of money. Hope that sounds good! :] 
31 10 YES 10 
10 10 hi hope your doing well. i plan on doing the same thing as before 14 10 YES 10 
10 10 50-50 :] 2 10 YES 10 
10 10 Same thing? 2 10 YES 0 
10 10 I think we should do $10 each again ¶  works out best for the both 
of us. 
16 10 YES 10 
9 9 Let's do the same...It worked and we both made some money!!!! 11 9 YES 9 
10 10 Hey beautiful. I hopee your having a good day. Truthfully ¶  I'll 
get you more money if you say IN. 
19 10 YES 8 
9 9 well we worked together so far- want to do it again? at least we'll 
both make more than $5 
19 7 YES 7 
10 10  0 10 YES 0 
9 9 i will keep my promise! 5 9 YES 9 
10 10 trust me 2 20 YES 20 
7 7 I'm not quite sure what to say ¶  but hi!:) 9 10 YES 0 
9 9 lets do this! 3 10 YES 15 
9 9  0 10 YES 10 
9 9 same deal. 2 9 YES 9 
10 10  0 10 YES 8 
9 9  0 10 YES 10 
9 9 I'm not entirely sure what I'm supposed to say ¶  BUT point is I 
promise I will not jip you out of money. What I promise is what 
you'll get and I hope you will not jip me out of any money either 
:) 
43 9 YES 9 
6 6  0 7 NO  
9 9  0 10 NO  
7 7 I'm planning on offering the same amount so we can potentially 
just do the same thing as before 
18 7 NO  
8 8 choose IN ¶  i will transfer you the promised amount of $ 11 9 NO  
8 8  0 7 NO  
10 10 we need eachother to make money. 7 20 NO  
8 8 Hi 1 7 NO  
7 7  0 7 NO  
9 9  0 8 NO  
8 8 We the People of the United States of America, ¶ Inorder to form 
a more perfect Union, ¶ Do ordain and establish this constitution 
of the United States... 
24 8 NO  
10 10  0 5 NO  
6 6 I'll promise to transfer whatever amount I say 8 6 NO  
 
 
 
 
 
